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Abstract 
The past decades have witnessed a strong increase in household debt and high growth of 
private consumption expenditures in many countries. This paper empirically investigates four 
explanations: First, the expenditure cascades hypothesis argues that an increase in inequality 
induced lower income groups to copy the spending behaviour of richer peer groups and 
thereby drove them into debt (‘keeping up with the Joneses’). Second, the housing boom 
hypothesis argues that increasing property prices encourage household spending and 
household borrowing due to wealth effects, eased credit constraints and the prospect of future 
capital gains. Third, the low interest hypothesis argues that low interest rates encouraged 
households to take on more debt. Fourth, the financial deregulation hypothesis argues that 
deregulation of the financial sector boosted credit supply. The paper tests these hypotheses by 
estimating the determinants of household borrowing using a panel of 11 OECD countries 
(1980-2011). Results indicate that real estate prices and low interest rates were the most 
important drivers of household debt. In contrast the data does not support the expenditure 
cascades hypothesis as a general explanation of debt accumulation across OECD countries. 
Our results are consistent with the financial deregulation hypothesis, but its explanatory 
power for the 1995-2007 period is low. 
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1 Introduction 
There is an increasing recognition of the critical role rising household debt plays as a cause of 
financial crises (Bezemer et al. 2016; Bezemer & Grydaki 2014; Schularick & Taylor 2012; Mian & Sufi 
2009). However there is still relatively little systematic empirical research on the reasons for the 
spectacular rise of household debt in the last decades. In the nascent debate several factors have 
featured prominently.  
First, as rising income inequality has been documented (Atkinson et al. 2011; Piketty 2014), 
inequality has gained prominence in explaining rising household debt. Kumhof et al. (2012) have 
proposed a two-class DSGE model where poor households are pushed into debt as they are trying to 
maintain their consumption levels. Several authors (Frank et al. 2014; Kapeller & Schütz 2014; Ryoo 
& Kim 2014; Behringer & Treeck 2013) have argued that rapidly growing top incomes lead to rising 
household debt if consumers follow social norms and imitate the lifestyle and expenses of richer 
peers. This latter argument is based on a behavioural economics approach, in particular other-
regarding social norms for which there exists empirical support especially in the context of 
consumption and saving (Alvarez-Cuadrado & Japaridze 2017; Kim et al. 2015; Drechsel-Grau & 
Schmid 2014). We will refer to this as the expenditure cascades hypothesis (ECH) of household debt. 
Second, rising real estate prices are another explanation for rising household debt. Most household 
debt is, in fact, mortgage debt. Jordà et al. (2016) document the rising importance of mortgage debt 
and highlight its link to real estate prices with historic macroeconomic data. Borio (2014), Goodhart 
and Hofmann (2008) and Leamer (2007) identify property prices as one of the key variables for 
financial and business cycles. Ryoo (2016) presents a formal Minsky model where household debt is 
driven by property prices. Bezemer et al. (2017) document in a new panel covering 74 countries that 
mortgages where the primary driver of household credit over their 1990-2011 sample period. 
However while there is an extensive literature on the effects of property prices or housing wealth on 
consumption expenditures, (see the surveys by Cooper and Dynan (2016) and Paiella (2009)), there is 
much less on their effects on household debt. This paper refers to this argument as the housing 
boom hypothesis (HBH): home buyers take out larger mortgages relative to their income in the face 
of rapidly rising house prices.   
Third, the influence of monetary policy on household borrowing decisions works via interest rates. If 
central banks keep interest rates at very low levels, cheap (mortgage) rates will attract borrowers 
who may struggle with their repayments when interest rates increase. This explanation is called the 
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low interest rate hypothesis (LIH). Taylor (2009) has prominently argued that the failure of the US 
central bank to increase interest rates1 in the early 2000s has been a main cause of the financial crisis 
and an over indebted household sector. Sinn and Valentinyi (2013) have made a similar argument for 
Europe and claim that European monetary unification has led to low interest rates in southern 
Europe, which resulted in a debt boom.  
Fourth, financial deregulation and financial innovation may be behind the rise in household debt. If 
the financial sector becomes more risk seeking and its willingness to lend increases, households will 
be able to take on more debt. In particular for the USA, increasing securitization and the rise of the 
originate-to-distribute model of banking have been cited as causes of the crisis (Crotty 2009; 
Purnanandam 2011). More generally, if financial regulations are lifted this can boost credit supply 
and lead to increased household borrowing. We will refer to this explanation as the financial 
deregulation hypothesis (FDH) (Borio 2014; Borio & White 2004; Mian & Sufi 2009; Justiniano et al. 
2015).  
The contribution of this paper is to assess these hypotheses empirically. We are particularly 
interested in their ability to explain the increase in household debt prior to 2008.2 In order to do so a 
household debt equation is estimated for a panel of 11 OECD countries for the period 1980-2011. 
The existing literature on the determinants of household debt is rather thin and typically only 
considers some of these hypotheses in isolation. Perugini et al. (2016) is an important exception as 
they control for three of the four hypotheses investigated in this paper. However their paper does 
not distinguish between household and business debt and it does not take property prices into 
account. Bordo and Meissner (2012), and, similar, if critical, Gu and Huang (2014) investigate the 
effect of inequality on debt over a long period (1920-2008), but do not control for real estate prices 
or financial regulation. Also none of these studies allows or tests for potential long run relationships. 
Thus the existing literature lacks a comprehensive empirical study. Assessing the explanatory power 
of these hypotheses is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective, but also for economic 
policy because they have very different policy implications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarises the theoretical arguments 
involved and distils the key hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the relevant empirical literature on the 
                                                          
1
 In contrast Bernanke (2005) argues low interest rates are due to non-policy factors, in particular Chinese 
capital exports. 
2
 The focus of this paper lies on the first three hypotheses. We have less confidence in the financial 
deregulation hypothesis because, firstly, due to data availability, we only account for financial regulation, but 
not for financial innovation and, secondly, financial regulation may work with longer time lags than the other 
variables in our model.  
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determinants of household debt. Section 4 discusses the data sources and the econometric method. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes.  
2 Explanations of rising Household Debt  
While the effects of household debt have recently attracted interest, there is comparatively less 
research on the determinants of household debt. In this paper we distinguish between approaches 
that derive debt from asset transactions, those that derive it from consumption decisions and those 
that highlight economic policy and regulations. Explanations of household debt accumulation, which 
emphasize asset transactions and real estate transactions in particular, are summarised under the 
label ‘housing boom hypothesis’ (HBH). Different authors propose different links between house 
prices and household indebtedness. First, New Keynesian3 authors (Iacoviello 2005) argue that rising 
residential real estate prices can ease binding credit constraints and thus have the potential to boost 
household borrowing. If banks primarily consider collateral values when they grant loans, this can be 
an important channel through which rising real estate prices drive up household debt. In the New 
Keynesian framework binding credit constraints imply that even transitory increases in property 
prices will lead to increased household borrowing. Second, in Post Keynesian4 stock flow consistent 
(SFC) models (Godley & Lavoie 2007; Zezza 2008; Nikolaidi 2015) household behaviour is anchored by 
so-called stock-flow norms. Assuming that consumption depends on disposable income and some 
measure of wealth, households will attempt to reach a target wealth-to-income ratio (Godley and 
Lavoie 2007, p.75). If property prices rise and household sector wealth increases beyond the target 
ratio, households will consume that ‘excess wealth’ by taking on debt if they cannot or do not want 
to sell their assets. Third, residential real estate prices increasing faster than disposable income, will 
lead to households taking out bigger mortgages relative to their income, if they are not willing to 
postpone their home purchases. This argument implicitly assumes that households are not perfectly 
foresighted, rational decision makers but are either myopic or follow rules of thumb. All three 
arguments imply that rising property prices encourage household borrowing and are summarised as 
the housing boom hypothesis.  
Regarding household expenditures, behavioural economics stresses that household preferences may 
be interdependent. People’s wellbeing and behaviour is influence by the behaviour of peers. Building 
on Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), Frank (1985) and Frank et al. (2014) emphasize that 
                                                          
3
 We use the term “New Keynesian” to refer to micro founded models which incorporate several market 
frictions such as sticky prices, credit constraints or information asymmetries. 
4
 The label “Post Keynesian” refers to aggregated macroeconomic models which emphasize the role of effective 
demand and are not based on rational optimization as the decision making process. 
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households do not only spend in order to fulfil their needs but also to signal status. They argue that 
households’ expenditures not only depend on own income but also on the expenditures of other 
households. In particular Frank et al. (2014) argue that households compare themselves with peers 
who are richer than themselves, i.e. people look up the distribution of income when assessing their 
status. In times of growing top incomes, those households in the bracket just below the top group 
will be trying to keep up with the richer top group and take on debt in order to finance their status 
comparison-induced expenditures. Households in the third income bracket will run into debt when 
they try to keep up with those in the second bracket etc.. The result is a cascade of debt-financed 
status expenditures flowing downwards from the top of the income distribution; thus we use the 
term expenditure cascades hypothesis (ECH). Several authors have incorporated these assumptions 
in Post Keynesian macroeconomic models (Belabed et al. 2013; Kapeller & Schütz 2014; Ryoo & Kim 
2014; Cardaci 2014). A similar explanation of increased household borrowing posits that households 
(building on prospect theory) do not want to reduce consumption below levels reached in the past or 
below a minimum level. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) adopt the latter approach and show that a 
decline in bargaining power of workers leads to increased income inequality and results in a debt-
financed attempt to maintain living standards. While similar to ECH in terms of the prediction that 
higher inequality may lead to higher consumption Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) is based on self-
regarding (rather than upward-looking) preferences and stagnant income for the lower group.  
There are several authors who regard the changes to the regulatory framework of the financial 
industry over the last two decades as the key factor in explaining rising household debt levels (Crotty 
2009; Mian & Sufi 2009; Rajan 2010).5 We refer to this as the financial deregulation hypothesis (FDH). 
In particular the shift from a traditional originate and hold to an originate and distribute model of 
banking, where banks sell off their loans in the form of asset backed mortgage securities is blamed 
for over accumulation of debt in the household sector (Mian & Sufi 2009). This switch has led to 
declining lending standards because the risks associated with issuing mortgages to low quality 
borrowers could be quickly removed from the issuing institution’s balance sheets. This gave low 
quality debtors who were previously excluded access to the mortgage market. In addition, 
households which already had a mortgage, were able to take out larger ones relative to their 
disposable income. Both effects led to higher aggregate debt levels. Another policy-related argument 
is that low interest rates, especially after the dot-com bubble in the US, encouraged households to 
take on unsustainable debt loads. We will refer to this explanation as the low interest rate hypothesis 
                                                          
5
 It is important to point out that for Rajan (2010) financial deregulation and easing of credit constraints is the 
result of political pressure due to increased income inequality. 
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(LIH). Taylor (2009) is a prominent proponent of the LIH for the US case. He argues that central banks 
and the Fed in particular kept interest rates too low for too long and effectively failed to follow a 
rule-based policy approach which he proposes. For Europe Sinn (2014) argues that common 
monetary policy resulted in low interest rates for southern European countries which encouraged 
debt-fuelled bubbles. Interest rate discrepancies were exacerbated by private investors’ disregard for 
country-specific default risk. The LIH is at its core a theory of government failure, unlike ECH and 
HBH, which are about private sector mechanisms. 
To investigate these arguments the paper estimates a debt accumulation function which models the 
stock of household sector debt as a function of disposable income (𝑌𝐷), property price indices (𝑃𝑃), 
a measure of income inequality (𝑄), a real interest rate (𝑅), the population share older than 65 (𝑂𝐿𝐷) 
and a credit regulation index (𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷): 
𝐷 = 𝑑(𝑌𝐷 , 𝑃𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑅, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷,𝑂𝐿𝐷)    (1) 
According to the ECH households engage in debt-financed spending in an attempt to emulate the 
social status of richer peers. Thus household borrowing increases with income inequality: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑄
> 0. 
According to the HBH, changes in debt are driven by asset transactions and collateral-backed 
borrowing due to wealth-effects. Here the key driving variable are property prices: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑃𝑃
> 0. The FDH 
argues that credit market deregulation allowed financial institutions to increase lending, which 
enabled households to take out larger mortgages relative to their disposable income and also gave 
previously excluded households access to the mortgage market. Thus credit market deregulation 
drives up household borrowing: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷
> 0. Finally, according to the LIH low real interest rates have 
encouraged households to take on debt at unsustainable rates: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑅
< 0. Table 1 summarises these 
hypotheses. 
Table 1. Hypotheses on debt determinants  
 Hypothesis Theoretical Argument Predicted signs 
 1 
expenditure cascades 
hypothesis (ECH) 
Households make consumption 
decisions with respect to richer peers. 
Consumption decisions drive debt 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑄
> 0   
2 
housing boom 
hypothesis (HBH) 
Debt is driven by asset transactions and 
wealth effects. Rising asset prices lead 
to higher debt and higher spending. 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑃𝑃
> 0    
3 
financial deregulation 
hypothesis (FDH) 
Deregulation of the financial industry 
lifts lending restrictions and allows 
households to take on more debt. 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷
> 0  
4 
low interest rate 
hypothesis (LIH) 
Loose monetary policy in the form of 
low interest rates encourages 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑅
< 0  
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household borrowing. 
𝐷 is household debt, 𝑄 is a measure of income inequality, 𝐶 is a measure of aggregate consumption, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 
stands for credit regulation, 𝑅 is a real interest rate and 𝑃𝑃 indicates property prices. 
The way we have specified the partial effects implicitly assumes that they work in the upswing as 
well as in the downswing of the business cycle. However there are reasons why this symmetry may 
not hold in practice. Most importantly, it is easier for households to accumulate debt during a boom 
than to deleverage in particular in a recession with falling incomes. We will thus also investigate 
whether there is evidence for asymmetric adjustment.  
3 The Empirical Literature 
The Financial Crisis triggered by the collapse of the US mortgage market has motivated a wave of 
empirical studies which look at the relationship between the trend of rising income inequality and 
household indebtedness (Klein 2015; Perugini et al. 2016; Gu & Huang 2014; Malinen 2014; 
Behringer & Treeck 2013; Bordo & Meissner 2012; Kumhof et al. 2012). Most of these studies are 
motivated by the theoretical work of Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2010) and do not 
estimate theory-derived structural models but rely on ad hoc specifications instead. For example 
Perugini et al. (2016) apply a dynamic system GMM estimator to a panel of 18 OECD countries from 
1970 and 2007. They find a positive impact of top income shares on private sector debt. Gu and 
Huang (2014) and Bordo and Meissner (2012) in contrast use long data series going back to the 1920s 
and the logarithmized difference of real private sector debt as their dependent variable. The latter do 
not find a positive impact of top income shares whereas the former do claim to find such a 
relationship but it hinges on interacting the inequality measure with GDP growth.  
Table 2: Effects of income distribution on household debt 
authors specification country findings 
Behringer 
and van 
Treeck 2013 
CA=f(Top1/Gini, NFA, 
govB, rel. Y, old, n, 
PC,); also use HFB and 
S instead of CA 
annual data, G7, 
1972-2007 
top income shares and Gini coefficients 
have negative effects on dep. vars. 
Bordo and 
Meissner 
2012 
DBP=f(Top1, R, GDP, I, 
M) 
 
annual data, 14 
OECD countries, 
1920-2008 
no statistically significant effect of top 
1% income shares on dep. var. and 
negative interest rate effect 
Gu and 
Huang 2014 
DBP=f(Top1,R,GDPc, 
Iy,M) 
 
annual data, 14 
OECD countries, 
1920-2008 
statistically significant positive effect of 
top 1% income shares on dep. var. if 
interacted with GDP growth and pos. 
interest rate effect 
Klein 2015 CPH=f(Top1, Gini, annual data, 9 statistically significant positive effect of 
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wage share), 
 
OECD countries, 
1953-2008 
top 1% income share, Gini coefficient, 
wage share 
Kumhof et 
al. 2012 
CA=f(Top1, youth, old, 
trade, PC, rel. Y, g, 
govB, NFA), 
annual data, 18 
OECD countries, 
1968-2006 
statistically significant negative effect 
of top income shares on current 
account,  
Malinen 
2014 
DBP=f(Top1, GDPc, Iy, 
M, R), 
 
annual data, 8 
OECD countries, 
1960-2008 
statistically significant positive effect of 
top 1% income shares on dep. var. 
Perugini et 
al. 2016 
DCP=f(Top1, R, FD, 
My, GDPc, g, Iy, PI), 
 
annual data, 18 
OECD countries, 
1970-2007 
statistically significant positive effects 
of top 1% / 5% / 10% income shares on 
dep. var. and no interest rate effect, 
positive deregulation effect 
CA stands for current account balance in % of GDP, HFB is the household sector financial balance in % of GDP, S 
is the household sector saving rate, DBP is real domestic bank loans to the private sector from the Schularick 
and Taylor (2012) data set., CPH is real credit to household sector per capita, DCP is domestic credit to the 
private sector in % of GDP, Top1 is the top 1% income share, R stands for interest rates, g for real GDP growth, 
GDP(c) is real GDP (per capita), I(y) is investment (in % of GDP), NFA is stock of net foreign assets in % of GDP, 
M(y) is M2 (relative to GDP), PI is portfolio investment in % of GDP, youth and old are the shares of under 15 
and over 65 year olds, trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods in % of GDP, PC is private credit in % of 
GDP, rel. Y is per capita income in PPPs relative to the US, govB is the general government fiscal balance  and 
FD are financial deregulation proxies. 
Only Perugini et al. (2016) make an attempt to control for credit supply conditions and find a positive 
effect of the credit market deregulation index supplied by the Fraser Institute. When it comes to the 
effects of interest rates, results are mixed. Perugini et al. (2016) find no statistically significant effect, 
Bordo and Meissner (2012) find a statistically significant negative effect and Gu and Huang (2014) 
report a statistically significant positive effect.  
Klein (2015) and Malinen (2014) are motivated by previous empirical studies and the lack of 
cointegration tests therein. Both investigate bivariate cointegration relationships between household 
debt (Klein 2015) or bank credit to the private sector (Malinen 2014) and top income shares. They 
find that debt and income inequality are cointegrated. Klein (2015) estimates the cointegrating 
vector in a strictly bivariate model whereas Malinen (2014) controls for short run fluctuations in GDP, 
investment and the money stock M2. A key shortcoming of this approach is that it almost surely 
suffers from omitted variable bias since inequality is not the only factor driving household or private 
debt. We aim to address this problem in this paper by going beyond bivariate models. 
Behringer and van Treeck (2013) and Kumhof et al. (2012) do not investigate the determinants of 
private sector or household debt but focus on the current account balance in % of GDP instead. They 
argue that if households engage in debt-financed expenditure cascades due to upward-looking status 
comparison, then household net-lending will decrease and given the corporate and public sector 
balance the current account will deteriorate. Thus they estimate a model with the current account as 
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dependent variable and top income shares as their preferred measure of income inequality. A 
negative effect of top income shares on the current account balance is interpreted as inequality 
induced spending and evidence in favour of the expenditure cascades hypothesis. Both studies 
report negative effects of top income shares but do not control for credit market supply shifts or 
interest rates. Table 2 summarizes the empirical literature investigating the effects of shifts in the 
distribution of income on household borrowing.  
It is important to emphasize a common characteristic which all of the papers discussed so fare share: 
They do not include real estate prices in their analysis. This is interesting because there is a large time 
series literature which consistently finds a positive link between property prices and household 
sector borrowing6. However at the same time the property price literature ignores the swings in the 
distribution of income as a relevant factor. This paper is an attempt to bring these two branches of 
the literature on household debt together. 
The number of studies using panel data for investigating the impact of property prices on household 
borrowing is small compared to the number of time series papers on the topic. Égert et al. (2006) 
estimate the determinants of credit to the private sector over GDP in order to assess whether debt 
levels in central and eastern European countries are in line with long run equilibrium estimates. They 
use simple fixed effects models as well as the mean group estimator (Pesaran et al. 1999) and 
dynamic OLS and find a significant and positive effect of house prices on private credit. They also 
include the spread between lending and deposit rates as a proxy for competition within the banking 
sector but it remains statistically insignificant as long as house prices are included in the regression. 
They find positive as well as negative interest rate effects varying across samples and estimation 
methods.  
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) estimate a panel VAR based on a sample of quarterly data from 1970-
2006 of 17 OECD countries. The VAR includes nominal bank credit to the private sector, nominal 
house prices, real GDP, the CPI, nominal interest rates and the money aggregate M3. Based on 
Granger causality testing and a simple Cholesky decomposition (ordering: GDP, CPI, interest rate, 
property prices, money, private credit) they find multidirectional links between these variables. They 
that house prices positively influence private credit and money. They also find a lasting negative 
                                                          
6
 In the time series literature most authors (Oikarinen 2009; Anundsen & Jansen 2013; Meng et al. 2013) use 
broad measures of household sector borrowing and report a statistically significant, positive long-run impact of 
property prices on borrowing. In contrast Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal (2010) restrict their analysis of 
property price effects in Spain to housing secured debt only and Chrystal and Mizen (2005) look at wealth 
effects on unsecured borrowing in the UK. Lastly, Arestis and Gonzalez (2014) and Hofman (2004) analyse the 
impact of property prices on private credit in OECD countries.  
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impact of higher interest rates. In order to account for shifts in the regulatory framework of credit 
markets they re-estimate the model on the shorter period 1986-2006 and find particularly strong 
effects of house prices.  
Table 3: Effects of property prices on household debt 
Authors specification Country findings 
Egert et al. 
2006 
PC=f(GDPc, BCgov, 
R, CPI, PP, FD, reg) 
annual panel data 
43 countries, 1975-
2004 
find a significant and positive effect of 
nominal house prices on private 
credit, no consistent finding with 
respect to interest rates  
Goodhart and 
Hofmann 2008 
panel VAR 
including: BCP, 
GDP, CPI, R, PP, M2) 
17 OECD countries, 
1970-2006, 
quarterly data 
interdependency between nominal 
house prices and household 
borrowing, statistically significant 
negative interest rate effect  
Rubaszek and 
Serwa 2014 
HL=f(GDP, R, GDPc, 
u, PP, longU) 
36 countries, 1995-
2009 
positive and highly statistical 
significant effect of real property 
prices on borrowing and positive 
interest rate effect 
PC stands for private credit in % of GDP, GDPc is GDP per capita, BCgov is bank credit to the government sector 
in % of GDP, R stands for interest rates, CPI represents an inflation measures, PP is a property price index, FD 
stands for financial deregulation proxies, reg is an indicator variable for public and private land registries, BCP is 
bank credit to the private sector, M2 is a money supply measure, HL is household credit in % of GDP, u is the 
unemployment rate and longU is the share of long term unemployed.  
Rubaszek and Serwa (2014) build a theoretical model of household borrowing and compare it with 
single equation cointegration estimations based on a panel of 36 countries. They use household 
borrowing relative to GDP as their explanatory variable and find a positive long run impact of house 
prices on household borrowing as well as a positive real interest rate effect. The spread between 
lending and deposit rates is used as a measure of banking sector competition. Table 3 summarizes 
the literature investigating the nexus between real estate prices and household borrowing. 
In addition to papers emphasizing distributional shifts and property prices as drivers of household 
debt, there is a literature which focuses on the impact of shifts in credit supply conditions and the 
deregulation of financial markets. However this literature hardly uses macroeconomic panel data and 
is therefore not directly comparable to this paper. Mian and Sufi (2009) for example use a ZIP code 
based panel data set of household borrowing information and argue that debt increased most in 
those areas where large proportions of the mortgage pool were securitized. They interpret this as 
evidence that in the US changes in the behaviour of financial institutions were key in enabling 
household debt accumulation. Jordà et al. (2015) use newly constructed long series of mortgage debt 
and assess the role of loose monetary conditions, measured by interest rates, for household 
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borrowing and house prices. Their conclusion is that especially in the post war era low interest rates 
strongly contributed to residential property booms and as a result mortgage debt booms.   
Five general patterns emerge from the empirical literature on the determinants of household and 
private sector borrowing: First, most studies do not distinguish between the household and the 
corporate sector. In contrast we explicitly use a measure of household sector borrowing instead of 
credit to the private sector. This is important because the channels influencing household and 
corporate borrowing are quite different and this paper is only interested in the former group. 
Second, there is a lack of studies which investigate the impact of income inequality and property 
prices on household borrowing simultaneously, although there is very robust empirical evidence 
backing the theoretical prediction of wealth effects. Starting to fill this gap is one of the main 
contributions of this paper. Third, most papers do rely on short run analysis of differenced data. If 
cointegration analysis is applied a bivariate relationship is tested. This paper aims to go beyond 
bivariate cointegration testing and thus avoid potentially serious omitted variable bias. Fourth, little 
attention is paid to the role of shifts in credit supply conditions. The most important reason is the 
inherent difficulty for measuring such shifts besides very broad measures such as debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Fifth, findings with respect to interest rate effects vary and are not consistent across studies and 
sometimes not even within studies. 
4 Data and Econometric Method 
Our dataset is an unbalanced annual panel covering 11 countries from 1980 to 20117. Definitions and 
data sources are provided in the Appendix (Table A1) as well as descriptive statistics (Table A2).  
Real residential property price indices are used as proxies for housing wealth of the household 
sector, because wealth data are not available (for sufficiently long time periods) for most countries. 
This is common in the literature estimating wealth effects.8 The drawback is that price indices 
capture quantity changes only indirectly. We use two different measures of the distribution of 
income. The share of total income which is received by the richest 1% of households (𝑇𝑂𝑃1) 
captures the dynamics at the top of the distribution. Since the expenditure cascades hypothesis 
predicts debt-financed spending sprees to be triggered by concentration of income at the top this is 
our preferred measure for testing that hypothesis. In addition we use a Gini coefficient which is 
                                                          
7
 The countries included are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and the US. 
8
 See Paiella (2009), Attanasio  and Weber (2010) and Cooper and Dynan (2016) for recent surveys. 
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directly computed from income data (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼). The Gini index is less sensitive to distributional changes 
at the top.  
Although shifts in credit supply conditions are important determinants of household borrowing, 
measuring the state of credit supply and the willingness to lend by financial institutions is difficult. 
One approach in the literature focuses entirely on credit regulations and financial reforms and argues 
that a less regulated financial sector should be expected to enhance borrowing. Indices based on the 
existence of interest rate controls, the relation of public to private borrowing, entry barriers to the 
financial sector and the existence of capital account restrictions are derived and used in empirical 
analysis. A widely used index following such an approach is the Fraser Index on credit regulation. A 
different approach aims to capture shifts in banks’ willingness to lend due to changes in the sector’s 
risk appetite (Fernandez-Corugedo & Muellbauer 2006).9 In this paper we will use the Fraser Index 
because credit supply indices in the spirit of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) are not 
available for the countries of our panel in a consistent form. A shortcoming of the Fraser index is that 
it does not capture shifts in the risk appetite of the financial sector. It also does not capture those 
changes to the regulatory framework which turned out to be key for the pre-crisis period: the use of 
off-balance sheet vehicles, increased proprietary trading and low capital requirements for assets in 
the trading book. 
We specify our debt accumulation equation as an error correction (EC) model:  
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑡∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
11
𝑝=0 +⋯+∑ 𝛽6𝑡∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
61
𝑝=0 − 𝛾𝑖(𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖,𝑡
1 +⋯+ 𝜃6𝑋𝑖,𝑡
6 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (2) 
The dependent variable 𝑍 is our measure of total household sector liabilities in billion of local 
currency (log⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑡)) and (𝑋
1, …⁡ , 𝑋6) are vectors of real disposable household income in billion of 
local currency (log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐷)), the income share of the richest 1% of households (𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑖𝑡), alternatively 
we also use a Gini coefficient (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡) of income inequality. Furthermore we use real property price 
indices (log⁡(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡)), the real long term interest rate (𝑅𝑖𝑡), the ratio of people older than 65 in the 
population (𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡) and the credit market regulation index published by the Fraser Institute 
(log⁡(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)) (subcategory 5A of the Economic Freedom of the World index). Monetary variables 
and the interest rate are deflated by the consumer price index.  
The key advantage of EC or autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models is that they allow for I(0) as 
well as I(1) variables and require no prior knowledge of the order of integration (Pesaran & Shin 
                                                          
9
 Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) estimate a common trend in  the volume of mortgages and 
unsecured debt and in the fraction of high loan-to-value and loan-to-income borrowers in the UK. They 
interpret this common trend as a credit conditions index. 
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1999). This means we are able to take a potential long run relationship into account instead of only 
using differenced regressors. Estimation is based on dynamic fixed effects (DFE) and the Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) as a robustness check. While the DFE restricts 
all coefficients to be identical across countries, the PMG approach allows the short term parameters 
and the adjustment speed to be heterogeneous across countries, while the long run equilibrium 
relationship is assumed to be homogeneous. Thus the PMG estimator represents a compromise 
between allowing for cross country parameter heterogeneity on the one hand and keeping the 
number of model parameters small on the other hand.10 In order to determine the lag structure of 
the error correction model we apply a testing down procedure. First a fully specified model including 
contemporaneous as well as one-period lags of all short term effects is estimated. This corresponds 
to including 2 lags in level form. Starting from this general specification statistically insignificant short 
run effects are removed sequentially.  
The estimated coefficients from equation (2) cannot be interpreted in a causal way, as we cannot 
fully rule out the possibility that an omitted third factor drives the dependent variable as well as 
some of the regressors. Also we cannot fully rule out the issue of reverse causation between 
household debt and property prices. Nevertheless we think estimating equation (2) is a fruitful 
exercise for two reasons. First, there is empirical evidence supporting the notion that higher 
residential property prices drive up household borrowing (Jordà et al. 2015; Mian & Sufi 2011). In 
addition, against the background of stagnant income growth in most countries of our sample over 
the last two decades, we are not convinced that households’ optimistic expectations of future 
productivity and wage growth was the key driver of household debt accumulation omitted from our 
model. Second, any causal statement about the drivers of household debt needs to be consistent 
with the patterns we find in the data. Therefore the reduced from regressions we present in this 
paper can be used to rule out explanations of household borrowing which are not consistent with the 
results. 
5 Determinants of Household Debt 
This section discusses the results from estimating equation (2), presented in Table 4. In columns (1) 
and (2) the top 1% income share is used as a measure of the income distribution while specifications 
(3) and (4) rely on a Gini coefficient. Furthermore columns (1) and (3) are based on DFE estimators 
                                                          
10
 For example estimating an unrestricted autoregressive distributed lag model 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(𝑝0, 𝑝1 , … , 𝑝𝑘) which 
allows estimates to be country specific with common lag length 𝑝, 𝑘 regressors and 𝑁 countries, requires to 
estimate 2𝑁 + (𝑝 + 1)𝑘𝑁 parameters. In contrast estimating the PMG version of that model only requires 
2𝑁 + 𝑘(𝑝𝑁 + 1) parameters. With 11 countries, 5 regressors and 1 lag this amounts to 132 and 82 
parameters, respectively. 
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while columns (2) and (4) are based on the PMG estimator as a robustness check. First, all four 
specifications exhibit a statistically significant adjustment towards the estimated long run trend. This 
indicates that there exists a cointegrating relationship. This result is further supported by carrying 
out panel unit root tests (Choi 2001) on the residuals (H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1)) from estimating equation (2) 
which lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of unit roots in the residuals. The p-values from these 
unit root tests are provided at the bottom of Table 4. The long run trend is characterized by an 
income elasticity of 1 since the hypothesis of a unit elasticity (H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1) is not rejected except in 
specification (4). This indicates that when holding the other explanatory variables constant, debt to 
income ratios remain stable. Conversely, rising debt to income ratios are explained by the remaining 
variables. Second, the long run residential property price elasticity is between 0.41 and 0.62 and is 
highly statistically significant in all specifications. Thus there is a strong direct link between real 
estate prices and household borrowing, which is in line with the HBH. Third, the estimated long-run 
income distribution semi-elasticities are not consistent across specifications and are statistically 
insignificant in most cases. While the positive coefficient on the Gini in specification (4) is consistent 
with the ECH, status-induced household borrowing should be closely related to rising top incomes as 
debt-financed expenditure cascades would be triggered at the top of the distribution. It is important 
to point out that also the short run income distribution coefficients are not statistically significant, 
which is why they were dropped. Fourth, the long-run real interest rate semi-elasticity is statistically 
significant and negative at the 5% level in the DFE specifications. This finding is in line with the LIH, 
which predicts lower real interest rates coinciding with higher household debt levels. Fifth, the old-
rage ratio is not a statistically significant predictor of household debt in most specifications and 
therefore is not included in later specifications. Only column (4) of Table 1 exhibits a statistically 
significant positive semi-elasticity of the old age ratio, which however is not in line with a basic life-
cycle interpretation. Finally the long run coefficient of the credit market regulation index is positive 
and highly statistically significant across all specifications. This latter finding is in line with the FDH 
which states that household debt expanded due to shifts in credit supply conditions as a result of a 
financial sector more willing to lend.  
So overall Table 4 provides strong and robust support for the HBH as residential real estate price 
coefficients are highly statistical significant across all specifications. Equally robust is only the 
statistically positive elasticity of the credit market regulation index which supports the FDH. Finding 
negative interest rate coefficients is sensitive to the estimation method while positive coefficients of 
the income inequality measure are only found in 1 specification while they are statistically not 
significant in the others. This latter finding is not consistent with the ECH. 
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Table 4: Household debt, baseline specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DFE PMG DFE PMG 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.984*** 0.888*** 0.954*** 0.687*** 
 
(0.22) (0.11) (0.23) (0.07) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.414*** 0.570*** 0.426*** 0.622*** 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.15) (0.04) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 -0.674 0.454 
  
 
(1.89) (0.75) 
  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
  
-0.169 3.438*** 
   
(1.07) (0.49) 
𝑅𝑡 -3.712** -0.601 -3.703** -0.421 
 
(1.50) (0.58) (1.49) (0.40) 
𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡 0.34 0.977 0.27 5.996*** 
 
(1.74) (1.31) (1.88) (1.01) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 0.790*** 0.710*** 0.780*** 0.439*** 
 
(0.28) (0.16) (0.28) (0.08) 
short run 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
-0.061*** -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.075** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
∆ log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.169*** 0.156* 0.166*** 0.209** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
∆ log(𝑌𝑡−1
𝐷 )  -0.131** 
 
-0.125** 
 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 ∆ log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.216*** 0.189*** 0.213*** 0.166*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
∆ log(𝑃𝑃𝑡−1) -0.106*** 
 
-0.102*** 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 ∆𝑅𝑡 0.182*** 0.094 0.185*** 0.115** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
∆ log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) -0.076*** -0.148*** -0.074*** -0.112*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡−1).  0.682*** 0.522*** 0.677*** 0.507*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.086 -0.048*** -0.066 -0.087** 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) 
N 362 374 371 374 
H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1 0.94 0.32 0.84 0.00 
H0: 𝛽𝑃𝑃 = 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Error correction models estimated with Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators. 
Dependent variable: ∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard 
errors in brackets. The bottom three lines of the table report p-values of hypothesis tests. H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1) is the 
hypothesis that the residuals contain a unit root and H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1 and H0: 𝛽𝑃𝑃 = 1 are the hypotheses that the 
long run elasticities for disposable income and property prices are equal to 1. 
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The results of Table 4 are based on the assumption that household borrowing reacts to increases and 
decreases in property prices as well as top income shares in a symmetric way. However since the 
process of leveraging up, especially in an environment of general optimism, is easier than to 
deleverage, potentially in an economic downturn, such symmetric behaviour might not hold. 
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 5 provide a test for that assumption. We re-estimate the baseline 
model with an additional indicator variable (𝐼𝑃𝑃) which is equal to one in periods of declining or 
stagnating residential property prices. This dummy is then interacted with the measure of real 
residential property prices itself. Table 5 shows the house price growth dummy itself as well as its 
interaction with property prices are not statistically significant. Thus we fail to find evidence 
supporting asymmetric responses of household borrowing to increasing and stagnant property 
prices. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 introduce the same dummy variable into the baseline model but 
interact it with the income distribution measures. The rationale is that if households are credit 
constrained, it might be the case that inequality induced borrowing only happens in periods of house 
price growth because rising property prices will ease the households’ credit constraints. However, 
neither the top income share specification in column (3) nor the Gini specification in column (4) 
supports this argument. In both cases the dummy for periods of house price growth and its 
interaction with the distribution measures are not statistically significant. Inequality induced 
household borrowing is not explicitly linked to periods of growing house prices. 
Despite the pronounced increase in top income shares over the last three decades in many OECD 
countries (Atkinson et al. 2011), we did not find measures of the distribution of income to be 
statistically significant predictors of household borrowing, neither in the long nor short run. In 
specifications (5) and (6) in Table 5 we define a post-crisis dummy (𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠) which is equal to one for the 
period 2009 to 2011 in order to test whether inequality induced debt accumulation was primarily a 
pre-crisis phenomenon. When interacting the post crisis dummy with the top income share and the 
Gini coefficient, neither the interaction nor the dummy nor the income distribution measures exhibit 
statistically significant semi-elasticities. The only exception is the interaction with the top income 
share in specification 5, which exhibits a negative coefficient, statistically different from 0 at the 10% 
level. Therefore, these interactions do not provide evidence for a positive link between higher 
income inequality and household borrowing and thus do not support the ECH.  
Table 5: Household debt, housing boom and post crisis interactions 
 
dummy for periods of 
declining PP (𝐼𝑃𝑃) 
dummy for periods of 
declining PP (𝐼𝑃𝑃) inter. 
post crisis dummy (2009-
2011) (𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠) interacted 
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interacted with PP with Top1 and Gini with Top1 and Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DFE DFE DFE DFE DFE DFE 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.930*** 0.966*** 0.934*** 0.944*** 0.956*** 0.997*** 
 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.374*** 0.367** 0.413*** 0.432*** 0.408*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) x 𝐼
𝑃𝑃  0.142 0.154     
  
 
(0.11) (0.12)     
  𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 0.428   0.471   1.64 
 
 
(1.96)   (2.09)   (2.17) 
 𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡⁡x 𝐼
𝑃𝑃 
 
  0.161   
  
  
  (1.26)   
  𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.317   -0.281 
 
-0.255 
  
(1.01)   (1.04) 
 
(1.07) 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡⁡x 𝐼
𝑃𝑃 
 
    0.527 
  
  
    (0.92) 
  𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 x 𝐼
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      -3.118* 
 
  
      (1.77) 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 x 𝐼
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      
 
-2.463 
  
      
 
(2.23) 
𝐼𝑃𝑃 0.04 0.045 -0.008 -0.231 
  
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.43) 
  𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      0.239 1.125 
  
      (0.18) (1.07) 
𝑅𝑡 -3.502** -3.962*** -3.504** -3.955*** -3.560** -4.246*** 
 
(1.38) (1.39) (1.42) (1.42) (1.46) (1.53) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 0.821*** 0.818*** 0.819*** 0.794*** 0.652*** 0.710*** 
 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) 
short run 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
-0.063*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.057*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 362 371 362 371 362 371 
H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Error correction models estimated with Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators. Dependent variable: 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Importantly all specifications in Table 5 remain consistent with the baseline results from Table 4: The 
long-run income elasticity of household debt is not statistically different from one, the long-run 
coefficients on real property prices and the credit regulation index are positive and statistically 
significant while the real interest rate coefficients are statistically significant and negative. 
Table 6 presents three robustness checks. First, the ability of households to borrow might crucially 
depend on the development and state of the domestic financial sector. Countries with more 
developed financial sectors might exhibit higher levels of household sector indebtedness. In addition 
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it may also be the case that borrowing is more sensitive to collateral values in more developed 
systems because financial institutions are (seemingly) better able to handle the risk of higher loan to 
income ratios. In addition a more sophisticated financial sector could be better at channelling the 
risks associated with uncollateralized borrowing for status expenditures to risk seeking investors. 
Thus debt-financed expenditure cascades should be more likely to happen in financially developed 
countries. In order to test these arguments we divide the sample into a group of countries with 
highly developed financial markets and a group of countries with less developed financial markets. In 
line with the literature (Law & Singh 2014) we choose domestic credit to the private sector relative to 
GDP as a proxy for financial development. Ranking countries based on this financial development 
measure in 2005 yields a group of seven highly developed countries consisting of: Japan, United 
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Australia. The six less financially developed 
countries in our samples are: Germany, Sweden, France, Norway, Italy, Finland and Belgium. In Table 
6, specifications (1) and (2) are based on the first group and specifications (3) and (4) are based on 
the second group. The regressions based on the sample of countries with highly developed financial 
sectors exhibit statistically significant residential property price elasticities of 0.81 and 0.97 
respectively. In comparison the long-run property price elasticities of household borrowing in the 
sample of countries with less developed financial sectors are only 0.37. While the standard errors 
especially for the first set of results are large, this pattern is consistent with collateral playing a more 
important role in higher developed financial markets where it is easier to re-mortgage and benefit 
from increasing property prices. However the results in specifications (1) to (4) do not support the 
notion that status induced borrowing is more likely to occur with more developed financial markets. 
The latter group of countries with more developed financial markets does not report statistically 
significant coefficients of the income distribution measures. Overall this sample split shows 
important differences between the two groups but still supports the main findings from the previous 
specifications: there is a statistically highly significant link between household borrowing and 
residential property prices as well as credit deregulation and low interest rates. There is no evidence 
of a positive link between higher measures of income inequality and household borrowing.  
Table 6: Robustness checks 
 
high financial 
development 
low financial 
development lagged PP no PP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  1.150* 0.837 1.077*** 1.092*** 1.159*** 1.448*** 
 
(0.66) (0.64) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.19) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.814** 0.968** 0.373*** 0.372**   
 
 
(0.37) (0.43) (0.14) (0.16)   
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log(𝑃𝑃𝑡−1) 
 
  
 
  0.292*** 
 
  
  
 
  (0.11) 
 𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 -0.59   -4.779**   -0.843 -1.845 
 
(4.32)   (2.43)   (1.66) (2.00) 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
 
0.723 
 
-1.575   
 
  
(2.32) 
 
(1.54)   
 𝑅𝑡 4.744 4.815 -4.640*** -3.297** -4.904*** -4.952*** 
 
(4.40) (4.64) (1.59) (1.33) (1.46) (1.39) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 1.487* 1.48 1.137*** 1.035*** 0.831*** 0.854*** 
 
(0.89) (1.07) (0.28) (0.30) (0.20) (0.24) 
short run 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
-0.037** -0.035* -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.064*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 137 141 171 174 349 362 
Error correction models estimated with Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators. Dependent variable: 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Lower case letters indicate 
variables are transformed by taking natural logarithms. Standard errors in brackets. 
A possible objection to our specification is that there may be an endogeneity problem due to inverse 
causation between property prices and household debt. While there is considerable evidence that 
higher property prices boost household borrowing (Rubaszek & Serwa 2014; Mian & Sufi 2011; 
Goodhart & Hofmann 2008), it might also be the case that additional household borrowing leads to 
higher demand for residential real estate and given that supply is inelastic, to higher property prices. 
Specification (5) of Table 6 presents a simple check whether such a reverse link distorts our results: 
only lagged values of property prices are used in the regression. Results are similar, but the 
estimated long-run property price elasticity of household debt is 0.29 (compared to 0.41 with 
contemporaneous property price effects, specification (1) in Table 4). This supports our argument 
that property prices are a key driver of household debt accumulation. Notably, all of the key results 
of the baseline specification are qualitatively similar: the top income share coefficient remains 
statistically insignificant, the real interest rate coefficients remain statistically significant and negative 
and the coefficient on the credit regulation index is significant and positive.  
In a final robustness check we assess whether higher inequality might work through the real estate 
market. Several of our explanatory variables might also push up property prices. For example, if the 
residence were the main item for social status comparison, then increasing income inequality might 
be triggering a debt-financed cascade of house purchases which could lead to increasing property 
prices if supply is inelastic. In order to allow for such a mechanism we drop residential property 
prices from the regression in order to allow the distribution of income to vary independently of 
property prices. Specification (6) of Table 6 clearly does not support such an argument. The 
coefficient on the top income share remains statistically insignificant but the disposable income 
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coefficient increases to 1.45 which emphasizes the important role of the housing market: Without 
taking property prices into account the model predicts implausible, because unsustainable, long run 
income elasticities above unity.  
Overall, the robustness checks support the main findings in the baseline specification. First, the long 
run income elasticity of household debt is statistically not different from one which indicates that 
holding factors such as property prices, interest rates and credit regulation constant, long run debt to 
income ratios remain stable. Second, real residential property prices exhibit a statistically highly 
significant positive long run coefficient. This finding is extremely robust across specifications and is 
consistent with the HBH. Third, top income shares and Gini coefficients do not exhibit statistically 
significant coefficients in most specifications. In particular the data does not support a positive link 
between the distribution of income and household borrowing as predicted by the ECH, neither in the 
group of countries with highly developed financial markets nor in a specification without property 
prices. Fourth, real interest rates and the credit regulation index exhibit statistically significant 
negative and positive elasticities, respectively. These findings are robust across specifications and are 
in line with the LIH and the FDH, respectively.  
While the signs of the estimated long run elasticities allow us to draw some conclusions about the 
explanatory power of the different hypotheses, the economic significance is crucial when it comes to 
assessing the relative importance of competing explanations. We want to compare the contribution 
of the different independent variables to changes in household debt over the 1995-2007 period. This 
will allow us to determine which of the three hypotheses consistent with our results (HBH, LIH, FDH) 
is most relevant for predicting household debt in the pre-crisis period. For that purpose cross section 
averages are taken of all series, after transforming monetary series into chained purchasing power 
parity 2005 dollars. Then predicted changes in debt to income ratios are computed based on the long 
run estimates obtained from DFE and PMG estimators. The method is described in detail in Appendix 
B, results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7: Contributions to changes in household debt to income ratios between 1995 and 2007 
  
actual change 
in 𝐷/𝑌𝐷 
predicted 
change in 𝐷/𝑌𝐷 
𝑌𝐷 𝑃𝑃 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 𝑅 𝑂𝐿𝐷 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 
DFE 44% 33% -2% 19% -1% 11% 1% 3% 
PMG 44% 33% -4% 27% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
The predicted change in debt is computed based on equation (5). Contributions of individual variables are 
computed equivalent to equation (7). Calculations used the estimated coefficients from columns 1 (DFE) and 2 
(PMG) in Table 4. Results were obtained by taking GDP weighted averages across countries after transforming 
monetary series into constant 2005 purchasing parity dollars. The product of the individual change factors 
yields the predicted change in 𝐷/𝑌𝐷. 
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Five results emerge from Table 7: First, household debt grows almost directly in proportion to 
disposable income when all other factors are held constant. This result is reflected by the fact that 
the contribution of disposable income to changes in the debt to income ratio over the 1995-2007 
period is very small and slightly negative at -2% and -4%, depending on the estimator. Second, real 
appreciations of residential property prices explain between 19% and 27% of the change in 
household debt to income ratios, ceteris paribus. This result supports the HBH which predicts that 
the main driver of debt to income ratios were strongly increasing real estate prices. The different 
contributions of 19% and 27% reflect differences in the DFE and PMG estimates. As can be seen in 
Table 4 the DFE specification exhibits a long run property price elasticity of 0.41 compared to 0.57 in 
the PMG specification. Third, the top income share is not very useful in predicting debt to income 
ratios. The ECH is not supported by the data. Fourth, real interest rates, explain about a third of the 
increase in debt to income ratios when using the DFE estimator. Fifth, demographic shifts and 
changes in credit market regulation played a negligible role for household borrowing outcomes 
according to the estimated model. Overall residential real estate prices stand out as the most 
important predictor of household debt to income ratios. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the explanatory power of rising income inequality, growing property prices, 
low interest rates and financial deregulation as causes of rising household debt by estimating a debt 
accumulation equation for a panel of 11 OECD countries spanning from 1980 to 2011. While we are 
not able to give a causal interpretation to our findings, any causal claim about the determining 
factors of household sector debt needs to be consistent with the patterns we find. It is in this spirit 
that we interpret our results. First, we find that real residential property prices are the single most 
important predictor of aggregate household debt to income ratios. Over the 1995 to 2007 period 
they explain between 19% and 27% out of the total 44% increase in the panel averaged debt to 
income ratio which is consistent with the prediction of the housing boom hypothesis. Since real 
estate is the most significant asset type for the vast majority of households in OECD countries, this is 
a highly plausible but often underappreciated result. Second, we fail to find a robust statistically 
significant relationship between income inequality measures and household debt. Using the top 1% 
income share as well as a Gini coefficient, we do neither find a robust positive nor negative 
relationship. This is not consistent with the expenditure cascades hypothesis. Third, the second most 
important predictor of household debt to income ratios are low interest rates which often show 
statistically significant coefficients, however are sensitive to estimator choice. For the 1995 to 2007 
period real interest rates explain between 11% and 2% out of the total 44% increase in the panel 
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averaged debt to income ratio, consistent with the low interest rate hypothesis. Finally we find that 
financial deregulation is a robust predictor of household borrowing, however the size of this effect is 
limited with an explained increase of the aggregate debt to income ratio of 3% between 1995 and 
2007. This low predictive power reflects the fact that our measure is a credit regulation index that 
does not capture changing practices in the financial industry which potentially played a more 
important role such as changes in risk appetite and lending practices. 
Our results endorse a view that regards household debt as an outcome primarily of real estate 
transactions, supported by loose monetary policy and financial regulation while the distribution of 
income only plays a minor role in explaining household indebtedness. Thus macroeconomic models 
that aim at explaining household debt should explicitly model real estate prices. When it comes to 
developing models for studying the emergence of debt-fuelled bubbles, ignoring the housing market 
is strikingly inconsistent with macroeconomic stylized facts. This does imply a word of caution 
towards the enthusiasm with which macroeconomists (Frank et al. 2014; Kapeller & Schütz 2014; 
Belabed et al. 2013) have embraced upward-looking consumption norms. 
With respect to the existing macroeconometric panel literature which investigates the drivers of 
private sector borrowing, we confirm the previous finding that real house prices are the most 
important predictor of household sector debt levels. In contrast we fail to find evidence for a positive 
link between an increasingly polarized distribution of income and household indebtedness as 
reported by several authors (Behringer & Treeck 2013; Gu & Huang 2014; Kumhof et al. 2012; Klein 
2015; Malinen 2014; Perugini et al. 2016). We think our paper is different in three key aspects which 
explain the differences in the results. First, none of these papers controls for the impact of property 
prices and thus face a potentially sever omitted variable problem. Second, many of them analyse the 
determinants of private sector debt, including the non-financial corporate sector, instead of the 
household sector. Third, only Kumhof et al. (2012) estimate fully specified, in contrast to bivariate, 
cointegration relationships which suffer from omitted variable problems 
This paper has taken a reduced-form approach, which allowed us to use panel data. Future research 
should distinguish between credit supply and credit demand. The difficulty of finding appropriate 
instruments for shifts in the credit supply for a broad set of countries, will make a time series 
approach attractive for such an exercise. Furthermore future analysis should address the 
endogenous nature of the involved variables, which lends itself to a systems approach. Disposable 
income, interest rates, house prices and credit all interact with each other and thus it might be worth 
to trade off degrees of freedom to model these interactions and to assess the robustness of the 
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results. Theoretically, our findings suggest the need to develop theoretical models that allow for 
boom bust cycles in real estate prices and household debt. 
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Appendix A: Definitions, descriptive statistics and unit root tests 
 
Table A1. Data definitions and sources 
abbreviation full variable name unit source 
YD Disposable real gross income, household 
sector (deflated using PC) 
national 
currency, billion 
AMECO 
PC Price deflator private final consumption 
expenditure (PCPH) 
2005=1 AMECO 
R 
Real long-term interest rates, deflator GDP 
% AMECO and OECD 
(MEI) 
OLD Fraction of population aged 65 and older % AMECO 
D Total credit to the household sector 
(deflated using PC) 
national 
currency, billion 
BIS 
TOP1 Top 1% income share of the SWIID  % SWIID v4 
GINI Gini coefficient (pre tax and post transfer) 
of the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database   
SWIID v5 
PP Real property prices BIS (exact definitions 
vary across countries, deflated using PC) 
2005=1 BIS 
SP Share price index (deflated using PC) 2005=1 IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
and OECD (MEI) 
CRED Fraser Index, Subcategory 5A Credit 
Regulation: percentage of privately held 
deposits (higher values higher percentage), 
interest rate controls (market rates and 
positive real rates result in higher values), 
private sector credit (higher values less gov 
borrowing) 
index between 
[0,10] 
Fraser Institute 
FIN Index of financial reforms measuring: 
credit controls, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, state ownership in banking, 
capital account restrictions, supervision of 
the banking sector and securities market 
policy. Policies in each of these 7 areas are 
awarded a number of 0 to 3 where higher 
numbers represent liberal policies. 
index between 
[1,21] 
IMF (Abiad et al. 
2008 - A New 
Database of 
Financial Reforms) 
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Table A2. Data summary statistics I 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
DH/YD overall 0.90 0.40 0.15 2.44 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.33 0.33 1.61 n 13 
  within   0.26 0.12 1.73 T-bar 32.2 
PC overall 0.86 0.20 0.23 1.26 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.06 0.76 0.98 n 13 
  within   0.20 0.33 1.28 T-bar 32.2 
R overall 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.12 N 400 
 
between 
 
0.00 0.03 0.04 n 13 
  within   0.02 -0.07 0.13 T 30.8 
OLD overall 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.24 N 407 
 
between 
 
0.02 0.12 0.17 n 13 
  within   0.02 0.08 0.23 T 31.3 
TOP1 overall 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.18 N 393 
 
between 
 
0.03 0.05 0.14 n 13 
  within   0.02 0.03 0.18 T 30.2 
GINI overall 0.45 0.05 0.29 0.55 N 406 
 
between 
 
0.03 0.39 0.53 n 13 
  within   0.03 0.35 0.53 T-bar 31.2 
PP overall 0.82 0.27 0.40 1.61 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.15 0.62 1.19 n 13 
  within   0.23 0.44 1.49 T-bar 32.2 
CRED overall 8.83 1.04 5.00 10.00 N 406 
 
between 
 
0.73 7.17 9.61 n 13 
  within   0.75 6.28 11.07 T 31.2 
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Table A3: Unit root tests, first differenced series 
  P L Z deterministic part 
dh 0.70 0.61 0.61 trend and constant 
yd 0.00 0.01 0.01 trend and constant 
pp 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
TOP1 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
GINI 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
OLD 0.69 0.98 0.97 trend and constant 
CRED 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
dh 0.07 0.05 0.05 constant 
yd 0.25 0.17 0.15 constant 
pp 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
TOP1 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
GINI 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
OLD 0.26 0.89 0.86 constant 
CRED 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
Panel unit root tests (H0: all series contain unit roots) based on Choi (2001) who uses the following labels: 
inverse chi-square test (P), inverse normal test (Z) and logit test (L). P-values from ADF tests with 3 lags are 
combined. Lower case letters indicate variables are transformed by taking natural logarithms.  
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Appendix B: Deriving effect size computations 
This appendix describes how the results for Table 7 are obtained. These effect size computations are 
based on the estimated long run elasticities. Taking the difference of the predicted dependent 
variable between 2007 and 1995 gives the predicted growth rate in that period. Equivalently the 
difference can also be expressed in terms of the independent variables according to the following 
equation:   
log (
?̂?2007
?̂?1995
) = 𝜃1 log (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 ) + 𝜃2 log (
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
) + 𝜃3(𝑄2007 −𝑄1995) 
+𝜃4(𝑅2007 − 𝑅1995) + 𝜃5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007 − 𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) + 𝜃6 log (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
) 
(A1) 
For equation (A1) all series are aggregated by taking GDP weighted cross section averages after 
transforming monetary series into chained purchasing power parity 2005 Dollars. ?̂?2007 and ?̂?1995 
represent the predicted long run debt levels in 2007 and 1995 based on these averaged series and 
the estimated long run coefficients. After some manipulation equation (A1) becomes: 
?̂?2007
?̂?1995
= (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
?̂?1
(
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
𝑒?̂?3(𝑄2007−𝑄1995)𝑒?̂?4(𝑅2007−𝑅1995)𝑒?̂?5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007−𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
)
?̂?6
 (A2) 
In order to obtain a change in debt to income ratios equation A2 can be transformed: 
?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
= (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
(?̂?1−1)
(
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
𝑒?̂?3(𝑄2007−𝑄1995)𝑒?̂?4(𝑅2007−𝑅1995)𝑒?̂?5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007−𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
)
?̂?6
 (A3) 
From equation (A3) each variable’s contribution to the predicted change in household debt to 
income ratios between 1995 and 2007 can be defined. For example in the case of disposable 
household income itself as well as property prices these contributions are:  
?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
⁄ = (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
(?̂?1−1)
    (A4) 
?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
⁄ = (
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
     (A5) 
The contributions to changes in household debt to income ratios between 2007 and 1995 for all 
variables are presented in Table 7. Results are presented based on DFE and PMG estimates, from 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 4, respectively. 
